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COMPTROLLER GENERAL ‘S 
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 
ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE PROVIDED TO KOREA BY 
THE AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
B-164264 
DIGEST ------ 
WHY THE REVIEW WAS F4ADE 
Dur'lng fiscal years 1966 and 1967, Korea received $266 8 million and 
$185 3 mllllon, respectively, In U S economtc assistance Korea was 
the fourth largest reclplent of Agency for International Development 
(AID) support In those years 
GAO reviewed selected aspects of the program in Korea because of the 
program's slgniflcance and of continu7ng congressional interest in AID's 
admlnlstration of foreign assistance 
The revlew was directed primarily to development loan proJects, now the 
largest sjngle segment of economic assistance to Korea 
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
/ 
Korea has made slgniflcant econom-rc progress In recent years$nd hopes 
to achieve a self-sustalnlng economy by 1971 It has been increasing 
Its foreign exchange reserves and is more and more able to obtain eco- 
nomlc assistance from sources other than the United States 
Consequently, sizable reductions were planned In U S assistance to 
Korea, begInning with fiscal year 1968 
Korea has made slgnlflcant economic Improvement in recent years, to 
which U S assistance has contributed substantially GAO belleves that 
the U S assistance provided to certain sectors of the Korean economy 
was not as effective as It could have been, in that 
--Delays occurred In completing electric power proJects Had these 
proJects been completed on schedule, power shortages would have 
been reduced. 
--Delays occurred In procuring dTese1 engjnes and rallroad shop equip- 
ment As a result, possible savings in operating costs were not 
fully realJzed 
--AID has not urged the Republic of Korea Government (ROKG) to instl- 
Lute an adequate program to Improve and expand coal production 
ROKG has neglected developing this domestic resource and has turned 
to Importing 011 as a basic fuel 
Teal Sheet 
--AID has continued to provide loans for small and medium industry de- 
velopment In Korea even though (a) prior AID loans had not been used. : 
(b) the ROKG has been IncreasIng its foreign exchange reserves more 
rapidly than anticipated, and (c) external flnanclng was available 
from sources other than AID 
RECOMMENDATIONS OR SUGGEST.lONS 
GAO proposed that AID 
--Take adequate measures to facilitate the lmplementatlon of loans so 
that lengthy delays ~111 be prevented 
--Reevaluate the necessity of future development loans for small and 
medium Industry development. 
--Make every effort to demonstrate to the ROKG the benefits of an ade- 
quate coal development policy and take measures to assist the ROKG 
in developing this industry 
AGENCY ACTIONS 
AID has Initiated a number of actions to reduce serious and lengthy de- 
lays in the lmolementatlon of large capital proJects A propoced in- 
crease of $72 million in an existing loan for small and medium ynoustry 
development 1s being delayed so as to coordinate the time of its avaIli 
ability to the time of depletion of the existing loan 
ISSUES FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION 
AID has concluded that power, transportation, and large capital proJects 
are of such priority to the ROKG that financing can and wili be obtained 
from sources other than AID and that AID should use a large percent of 
its lImited funds for development of medium and small lndustrles 
GAO believes that AID should also encourage the ROKG to use Its own for- 
eign exchange and to look to sources other than AID for small and medium 
lndustrlal loans AID should be a source of last resort 
As a means to help in answertng the coal versus 011 1 ssues. the Korean 
Institute of Science and Technology has been commissioned to carry out 
a study of overall energy demands and investment posslbllltles AID be- 
lieves that, as a result of this study, it ~111 be in a better posltloq 
to advise the ROKG 
LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS 
None. 
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COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S 
khPORT TO TH,?? CONGRESS 
ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE PROVIDED TO KOREA BY 
THE AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMEHT 
B-164264 
DIGEST ------ 
WHY THFJ RhVIa?iW WAS MADE 
During fiscal years 1966 and 1967, Korea received $266 8 mrlllon and 
$185 3 mllllon, respectively, in U S economic assistance Korea was 
the fourth largest recipient of Agency for International Development 
(AID) support ln those years 
GAO reviewed selected aspects of the program in Korea because of the 
program's slgnlflcance and of continuing congressional interest in AID’s 
administration of foreign assistance 
The review was directed primarily to development loan proJects, now the 
largest single segment of economic assistance to Korea 
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Korea has made slgnlflcant economic progress in recent years and hopes 
to achieve a self-sustaining economy by 1971 It has been lncreaslng 
its foreign exchange reserves and 1s more and more able to obtain eco- 
nomic assistance from sources other than the United States 
Consequently, sizable reductions were planned in U S assistance to 
Korea, beginning with fiscal year 1968 
Korea has made significant economic improvement ln recent years, to 
which U S assistance has contributed substantially GAO believes that 
the U S assistance provided to certain sectors of the Korean economy 
was not as effective as lt could have been, ln that 
--Delays occurred in completing electric power proJects Had these 
proJects been completed on schedule, power shortages would have 
been reduced 
--Delays occurred in procuring diesel engines and railroad shop equlp- 
ment As a result, possible savings ln operating costs were not 
fully realized 
--AID has not urged the Republic of Korea Government (POKG) to lnstl- 
tute an adequate program to improve and expand coal proauctlon 
ROKG has neglected developing this domestic resource and has turned 
to importing 011 as a basic fuel 
1 
--AID has continued to provide loans for small and medium industry de- 
velopment in Korea even though (a) prior AID ‘loans had not been used, 
(b) the ROKG has been increasIng Its foreign exchange reserves more 
rapidly than antlclpated, and (c) external flnanclng was available 
from sources other than AID 
RECOMMENDATIONS OR SUGGESTIONS 
GAO proposed that AID 
--Take adequate measures to facilitate the implementation of loans so 
that lengthy delays will be prevented 
--Reevaluate the necessity of future development loans for small and 
medium Industry development 
--Make every effort to demonstrate to the ROKG the benefits of an ade- 
quate coal development policy and take measures to assist the ROKG 
in developing this industry 
AGENCY ACT.TONS 
AID has lnltlated a number of actions to reduce serious and lengthy de- 
lays In the lmplementatlon of large capttal proJects A proposed In- 
crease of $12 mill'lon In an existing loan for small and medium Industry 
development 1s being delayed so as to coordinate the time of tts avall- 
ablllty to the time of depletion of the existing loan 
ISSUES FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION 
AID has concluded that power, transportation, and large capital proJects 
are of such pr'lority to the ROKG that flnanclng can and will be obtained 
from sources other than AID and that AID should use a large percent of 
Its limited funds for development of medium and small Industries 
GAO believes that AID should also encourage the ROKG to use its own for- 
elgn exchange and to look to sources other than AID for small and medium 
lndustrlal loans AID should be a source of last resort 
As a means to help In answering the coal versus 011 issues, the Korean 
Institute of Science and Technology has been commlssloned to carry out 
a study of overall energy demands and investment posslbllltles AID be- 
lieves that, as a result of this study, tt ~~11 be in a better positron 
to advise the ROKG 
LEGISLATUE PROPOSALS 
None 
INTRODUCTION 
The General Accounting Office has reviewed selected as- 
pects of the economic assistance program for Korea as ad- 
ministered by AID. Our review was directed primarily to 
development loan proJects, which are becoming the largest 
single segment of economic assistance to Korea. 
This review was made as part of our continuing review 
of foreign assistance programs, pursuant to the Budget and 
Accounting Act, 1921 (31 U.S.C. 531, and the Accounting and 
Auditing Act of 1950 (31 U.S.C. 67). Our review was made 
at the Washington office of AID and at the Agency's overseas 
mission in Korea, 
sion (USOM). 
known as the United States Operations MIS- 
The scope of our revJew is described on 
page 33. 
The principal officials responsible for the admlnistra- 
tron of activities discussed in this report are shown as 
appendix I. 
On November 2, 1967, we submitted our findings and pro- 
posals to AID for comment. AID's comments, which are set 
forth in a letter dated January 23, 1968, are presented as 
appendix II and, where appropriate, are discussed in the 
body of the report. 
OBJECTIVES AND ASSISTANCE 
UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES AND GOALS 
The general nature of AID's obJectives in Korea in the 
past few years has been: 
I'*** to develop its economic strength under condi- 
tions of political stability to help Korea increas- 
ingly meet its own needs and fulfill its aspira- 
tions, A strong ally, Korea 1s heavily dependent 
on substantial foreign assistance. It is important 
that the U-S. demonstrate in Korea the value and 
dependability of the U-S. alliance and support, and 
the effectiveness of the non-Communist approach to 
nation-building. The ultimate goal of the U.S- in 
Korea is to enable it to become economically 
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self-reliant, and to termrnate concesslonal ald, 
first by shlftlng the content of the program from 
grants to loans and subsequently by hardening the 
terms of U S lending until such times as Korea can 
afford commercial financing terms." 
The basic problems that cause the need for external as- 
slstance have been summed up by AID as follows. 
"(a) a llmlted resource base and a large and growing 
population, with a growth rate of 2.9%, Korea IS one 
of the most crowded countries In the world, the 
mountainous terrain provides relatively little cul- 
tivable area and few mineral deposits, In conse- 
quence, Korea's foreign trade posltlon has always 
been adverse, and her domestlc economy plagued by 
inflation, 
"(b) a small and Inexperienced managerial class, 
while education 1s relatively widespread, and lit- 
eracy high, the Koreans did not have the opportu- 
nity to manage their own government and business 
enterprise until after withdrawal of the Japanese; 
tradltlonal education has been Ill-suited to the 
technical and operational problems which the coun- 
try now faces, 
l'(c) the need to maintain one of the largest stand- 
ing armies In the world, In addltlon to ma-Jo-r MAP 
assistance, approximately 31% of Korea's national 
budget 1s utlllzed for defense expenditure." 
Since 1963 AID has evolved a framework of economic goals 
In which Its programs are dlrected. These goals were es- 
tablished to support the ROKG plans as set forth In the 
First Five-Year Plan (1962-66). AID efforts for 1967 were 
planned to support the Korean Second Five-Year Plan 
(1967-71) with five basic goals to 
1. Improve resource moblllzatlon and allocation. 
2. Accelerate growth and efflclency of domestic and ex- 
port lndustrles. 
3. Develop 
4. Improve 
5. Improve 
the rural economy. 
social planning and policies. 
government organization and administrative 
capability. 
UNITED STATES ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE 
United States economic assistance to Korea from incep- 
tion through June 30, 1967, 1s summarized In the folllowlng 
schedule: 
Obllaations and Loan Authorizations 
Fiscal years 
Before 
1962 gg 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1962-67 Totsl 
(millLons) 
AID and predecessor agencies 
Grants 
Loans 
$2 027 1 $ 94 6 $ 81 8 $ 77 3 $ 70 7 $ 64 9 $ 52 6 $ 441 9 $2,469 0 
25 3 25 25 27 47 79 60 265 8 291 1 
Total loans and grants 2.052 4 119 8 107 6 104 9 118 6 143 9 112 9 707 7 2,760 1 
Eood for Freedom (Public Iaw 480) 
Title I 60 6 62 7 79 6 34 3 41 4 38 5 317 1 
country use 176 5 493 6 
Loans 15 15 15 
Title II 
Bnergency relief 
Voluntary " 
221 - 12 23 2 20 3 69 8 24 7 139 2 161 3 
115 5 52 8 168 3 10 101 102 86 112 25 
Total food for peace 314 1 10 74 0 113 0 63 2 122 4 67 510 6 824 7 
Lxport-Import Bank loans 38 38 38 
Peace Corps 5 14 19 19 
Otlie~ U S economic programs 859 3 859 3 AA& &L&L 
. 
Total economic as- 
sistance $3.225 8 $190 6 $181 6 $217 9 $181 8 $2668 $185 3 $1 224 0 _L-- $4,&49 8 - ~ __ -- -- -- __ -__ 
As shown by the foregoing schedule, AID grants have 
gradually decreased since 1962 but AID loans have gradually 
increased. During fiscal year 1967 development loans repre- 
sented the largest single segment of economic assistance to 
Korea. 
Through June 30, 1967, development loans totaling 
$291.1 million had been authorized by AID and the predeces- 
sor Development Loan Fund (DLF). The loans are for power, 
transportation, communications, p ubllc works, lending, and 
commodity imports. Loan applications are received from the 
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ROKG and are subJect to feaslbrlrty studres to determlne 
the national and economic benefits to be derrved, the tech- 
nical feaslblllty, and the reasonableness of repayment. 
The loans are for long-terms (40 years), bear low-interest 
(up to 2-l/2 percent) and are, except for the DLF loans, 
repayable In dollars. They are generally made to the ROKG, 
which In turn relends the funds to the user or subborrower. 
The relending IS for a shorter term (about 12-20 years) and 
1s repayable to the ROKG in local currency (won). Repay- 
ments are placed into a special account and become available 
for relending or use as agreed upon by AID and the ROKG. 
The loans generally are used to purchase lnvestment- 
type items from United States sources. In agreeing to the 
loans, AID often requires investments by the subborrower, 
improvements In the conduct of his business, and the use of 
United States consultrng engineers to assist In determining 
and procurrng equipment. AID also retains the right to ap- 
prove the various steps of proJect rmplementatlon. 
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NON-UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE 
Korea has been one of the largest reclplents of exter- 
nal flnanclal assistance This assistance has averaged 
some $275 mllllon annually In recent years The main con- 
trlbutors have been the United States and other free-world 
countries The United States has been by far the major 
contributor 
International lending agencies have provided the fol- 
lowing flnanclal assistance to Korea as of fiscal year 
1967 
Fiscal year 
1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1946-67 ----- 
Interriatlonal Devel- 
opment Assoclatlon $14 0 - - - - $14 0 
Unlted Natlons Spe- 
clal Fund 1 6 $1 7 $1.0 $2.1 $1 4 11 0 
Other United Nations 
funds (note a> 4 4 4 7 7 47 - - - - 
$16.0 $2.1 $l,rc $2.8 $2 $29.7 ___ - - - 
aCalendar year 
Addltlonally, free world countries other than the 
United States have provided the following flnanclal assls- 
tance to Korea as of the end of calendar year 1966 
Calendar years 
1964 1965 1966 1960-66 
Japan $ 2 $50 4 $35.7 $ 91.9 
Germany 11.0 50 66 26 4 
Other 7 A 30 73 16 5 
$11.9 $58.4 @CL5 $134 8 
ADMINISTRATION OF UNITED STATES 
ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS 
The three maJor United States agencies in Korea, which 
are the Department of State, AID, and the Department of 
Defense operate under a country-team concept Under this 
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concept, It 1s the responslblllty of the U.S. Ambassador to 
direct, wlthln the framework of pollcles and goals estab- 
lrshed by the Department of State,the efforts of all par- 
ties. Generally, this country-team concept requires con- 
tact between team members to discuss current problems and 
resolve any questions. 
We discussed the workings of the country team In Korea 
with each member of the team and were informed by all mem- 
bers that they believed the team to be one of the best they 
had experienced. We were informed that meetings of the 
team were held whenever necessary and that consultations 
between two members are frequent. We were informed also 
that this cooperative effort extended Into the operating 
levels where day-to-day contacts were maintained so that 
each agency was aware of the efforts of the others In com- 
mon areas, 
In addition, we were informed that contact with United 
Nations agencies working In Korea 1s maintained to prevent 
dupllcatlon of effort and that the United States Informa- 
tion Service and Peace Corps programs are subJect to Amerl- 
can Embassy review and dlscusslon to ensure that they are 
conducted within established Department of State policy. 
The economic and technical assistance program for 
Korea 1s conducted under authority of a comprehensive aid 
agreement dated February 8, 1961. 
The AID Mission In Korea 1s known as the United States 
Operations Mission to Korea The ROKG counterpart to USOM 
1s the Economic Planning Board with which USOM works dl- 
rectly and which acts as a llalson between USOM and other 
ROKG agencies 
In July 1967, USOM employed 134 Americans and 363 Ko- 
reans. In addltlon, there were 57 Americans and 20 Koreans 
connected with the United States economic assistance pro- 
gram under contract to AID. 
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FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
ECONOHIC PROGRESS AND PLANNED REDUCTION 
OF UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE --- -- 
Korea has made very sqnlflcant economic progress in 
recent years, and It hopes to achieve a self-sustalnlng 
economy by 1971 Sizable reductions are planned In Unlted 
States economic assistance to Korea, beglnnlng with fiscal 
year 1968. 
Some lndlcators of the very sbgnlflcant economic prog- 
ress that Korea has made are presented below* 
1 Gross National Product (GNP) increased by an average 
of 8 5 percent a year over the 6-year period from 
1961 to 1967 Per capita GNP increased by a total 
of 29 percent --from $108 In 1963 to $139 by 1967 
2 Industrial production nearly doubled from 1961 to 
1966. It rose 18 percent in 1966 apd was expected 
to Increase about 21 percent In 1967 
3. Exports have Jumped from $33 mllllon in 1960 to 
$250 mrlllon In 1966 and are expected to exceed 
$350 mllllon in 1967 
4. Domestic government revenue more than doubled, In- 
creasing from $251 mllllon an 1965 to $550 mllllon 
In 1967, and 1s expected to reach $778 mllllon nn 
1968 
5. From December 31, 1965, to December 31, 1967, gold 
and foreign exchange reserves lncpeased from 
$146 mllllon to an estimated $356 mllllon The 
ROKG had set a goal of $190 mllllon, to be reached 
by December 1967. 
We believe that the followLng factors have contributed 
to this economic progress 
1. The substantial amounts of United States assistance 
have provided needed commodltres and technlclans 
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2. 
During fiscal years 1966 and 1967, Korea was the 
fourth largest reclplent of UnIted States economic 
assistance Assistance provided under AID and 
Food for Peace programs was equal to about 60 per- 
cent of Korea's total domestlc revenues for fiscal 
year 1966. r 
The increase In foreign exchange reserves was caused 
partly by earnings from Korean actlvltles In Vlet- 
nan. Foreign exchange earnrngs from these actlvltles 
were estimated to be about $150 mllllon during 1967. 
A portion of these earnings can be attributed to 
agreements entered into by the United States for 
special economic assistance to countries that have 
contributed military forces 1n South Vietnam. 
3. Improvements have been made In the organlzatlon and 
administratlon of the Government, and a more stable 
Government has been establlshed through improvements 
In training, posltlon classlflcatlons, salaries, and 
tenure. 
4. Outside experts have given quallfled approval to 
Korea's current 5-year development plan as a solid 
guide for economic development 
5 A maJor reform In the Interest rates 1s said to be 
a SnaJOr factor In the Improvement of domestic savings 
6. The Government has reorganized and improved its 
taxation agencies, established tralnlng programs, 
and changed the tax structure 
Korea 1s becomlng lncreaslngly able to obtain economic 
assistance from non-United States sources. During calendar 
year 1967 Japanese assistance totaled $104.1 million and 
assistance from free-world sources other than the Unlted 
States and Japan totaled $104.9 million. 
Sizable reductions are planned In AID economic assis- 
tance to Korea, beginning with fiscal year 1968 During 
fiscal year 1967, AID provided $112.9 mllllon in economic 
assistance to Korea. As a result of the significant 
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economic progress made by Korea, of Korea's ablllty to ob- 
taln assistance from other sources, and of reductions in 
U S foreign assistance appropriations for fiscal year 1968, 
AID plans to provide only $66 mllllon In economic assistance 
to Korea durrng fiscal year 1968. 
DEVELOPMENT OF INDUSTRY 
During the period covered by our review (1962-67), AID's 
primary assistance has been In the sector of rndustrlal 
expansion Assistance included development loans, suppor- 
trng assistance (commodity import program), Public Law 480 
imports, technical cooperation proJects, and utlllzatlon of 
local currency The extent of assistance by each program 
for the period July 1, 1961, through June 30, 1967, 1s 
shown In the following schedule- 
Type of assistance 
Development loans 
Direct to manufacturers 
For relending to industry 
Direct to service lndustrles 
Supporting assistance commodltles (note a) 
Production materials 
Capital goods 
Technical cooperation projects 
Local currency loans (Public Law 480 funds) 
Amount 
(millions) 
$213.0 
$ 14.5 
42 0 
136 5 
252 9 
249.3 
3.6 
14.3 
1.0 
aTh e commodltles imported are paid for by the importers In 
local currency (counterpart) which 1s owned by the ROKG. 
USOM and the ROKG agree on the uses of these funds--most 
of which have gone to support the ROKG budget. 
Need for addItIona power and 
transportation facilities 
Shortage of electric power 
The United States has provided about $157.4 mllllon In 
grants and loans for electric power production and dlstrlbu- 
tlon facllltles and technical assistance In Korea since 
1954. Despite this massive assistance, power avallablllty 
In Korea has not increased In proportlon to demand. The Ko- 
rea Electric Company ,(KECO) estimates that power will be in 
short supply through April 1968 and will then be ample until 
the fall of 1968. The primary cause of the current power 
shortage 1s attributed by the power industry and USOM offl- 
clals to the Increase of power needs that 1s due to rapid 
industrial expansion and has outstripped the capablllty of 
the power Industry. 
During our prior review In 1961, we noted that a short- 
age of electrical power was a contrlbutlng factor to low 
utlllzatlon of various production and other facllltles We 
recommended In our report (B-125060, September 21, 1962) 
that a concerted effort be made to implement planned power 
producing proJects and that a power development plan be de- 
vised. Subsequently, power production proJects were com- 
pleted, and In 1964 power ratlonlng was ellmlnated. Also, 
a power expansion plan was devised by a team of AID-financed 
consultants for KECO Until the spring of 1967, power pro- 
duction was considered sufflclent to supply the needs of 
the economy. At that time, a power shortage resulted be- 
cause of (1) expansion of the lndustrlal sector at a rate 
proportionally faster than expansion of the power production 
capablllty, (2) delays in power proJects financed by AID de- 
velopment loans, and (3) a drought. 
The power development plan made by KECO was soon re- 
vised because forecasts of power needs proJected a much 
higher rate of increase than had been used In the prepara- 
tion of the plan. By June 1966 KECO became aware that power 
demand would outstrip production In June 1967 Measures 
were proposed by KECO, lncludlng lnstallatlon of small tur- 
bine generators, which would decrease but not eliminate the 
proJected shortage. The increased proJected demand was 
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attributed to additional industrial users. According to 
ROKG officials, a relatively sluggish export performance in 
the first half of 1967 was partly attributable to the elec- 
tric power shortage. 
AID informed us in January 1968 that USOM had been 
aware of the problem, because USOM, KECO, and the ROKG have 
participated in a Joint committee to keep power needs and 
the construction program under review. However, they have 
stated that, although emergency measures to provide addl- 
tlonal temporary power units have been taken, there still 
will be a shortage until a thermal plant 1s placed in ser- 
vice in April 1968 Power will then be ample until the fall 
of 1968. Moreover, KECO is negotlatlng for addItiona gas 
turbine capacity, which could be available by the fall of 
1968 
Need to improve railroad 
capabilities 
Although AID has provided substantial funds to improve 
the railway transportation system In Korea, thus basic in- 
dustry is still considered to be a problem area in the Ko- 
rean economy. A lack of sufficient freight cars and of 
necessary improvements to railroad facilities 1s hindering 
effective operation and, as a result, other sectors of the 
economy have suffered adverse effects. 
AID and its predecessor agencies have provided about 
$228.3 million in grants and loans to the Korean National 
Railroad (KNR) since 1954. Another $27.4 million has been 
provided to KNR through loans from Japan, Great Britain, 
and the Internatlonal Development Association (IDA) of the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). 
KNR and USOM have been aware of a continuing shortage 
of freight cars since at least 1961, when KNR obtained a 
loan from IDA for the purchase of some needed freight and 
passenger cars At that time, KNR estimated that 1,000 
freight cars would be required to meet the short-term needs 
of the economy and over 3,600 additional freight cars would 
be required by 1966 KNR requested $20 million from IDA 
but obtained only $14 million, with which they purchased 
930 freight cars as well as 115 passenger cars. 
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According to a study of KNR performed by a team from 
IBRD, KNR obtalned only 1,123 of the required freight cars 
by 1966, which left a shortage of about 2,500 cars Cur- 
rent estimates by the IBRD team are that KNR must obtain 
over 4,600 freight cars by 1977. In order to meet antlcl- 
pated need. In addltlon, this team states 1,000 cars should 
be rebuilt. 
Korea experienced a coal shortage In the 1966-67 winter 
season, which was attributed to a transportation shortage 
rather than a shortage of coal. During this shortage the 
ROKG encouraged the use of 011 In lieu of coal in electric 
thermal plants and heavy industry, which thus necessitated 
using Korean-owned foreign exchange (KFX) for purchasing 
tse 01-L 'JSOY estimated that the addltronal cost of using 
011 rathe- than coal was over 261 mllllon won (almost 
$1 milliorl) 
The agricultural Industry also was affected by the 
1966 transportation shortage. Although the ROKG planned 
to move by rail 750,000 metric tons of limestone to be used 
to neutralize acidic sol1 during the 1966 growing season, 
KNR could only haul 144,000 metric tons because of the 
shortage of freight cars. Agricultural experts estimate 
that, had the planned amount of limestone been applied, a 
net increase of over $32 mllllon in crop yield would have 
resulted. In addition, we noted that In 1966 the ROKG had 
to import over 18,000 metric tons of rice costing over 
$3 million in KFX Furthermore, AID agricultural experts 
have estimated that the spring 1967 crop of barley will be 
reduced by 53,000 metric tons because of a lack of limestone 
during 1966 It appears likely that, had KNR obtained their 
estimated freight car requirements, the recent shortage of 
freight hauling capablllty would not have occurred, or at 
least would have been less severe 
At the time of our review, KNR had applied for an ad- 
ditional loan from IDA to purchase 1,100 freight cars and 
also had some other foreign loans pending for additional 
procurement of 1,331 freight cars and for material with 
which to manufacture an additional 1,378 freight cars 
The IBRD transportation survey showed other needs for 
rallroad improvements that are required to effect operational 
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improvements In the system. These areas Include lmprove- 
ments In station facllltles, marshalllng of yards, double 
tracking in many areas, central traffic control automatic 
block signals, and communlcatlons, all of which would fa- 
cilitate a faster andsmootherflow of traffic and allow for 
more effective rolling stock utlllzatlon. 
AID informed us In January 1968 that IDA had Just 
slgned an $11 mllllon credit for 1,050 addltlonal freight 
cars and that IDA 1s also provldlng experienced technicians 
to assist KNR in several areas It 1s believed that these 
efforts will provide for the betterment of KNR operations. 
In commenting on our findings, AID informed us In Jan- 
uary 1968 that 
"Because of A I.D.'s planned phase-down in Korea, 
we have already discussed Tnth the ROKG the need 
for them to look to other sources for financing, 
particularly for power, transportation, and large 
capital proJects. The President of the KECO re- 
cently tdld A.1 D that KECO had Just completed 
plans for the foreign exchange financing for all 
their power plant construction through 1975 ***. 
This includes flnanclal assistance from Germany, 
Italy, Japan, U.S. private sources and possibly 
U.S. Export-Import Bank I' 
AID has concluded that power, transportation, and large 
capital proJects are of such prlorlty to the ROKG that fl- 
nanclng can and ~111 be obtalned from sources other than 
AID AID believes that It should be the source of last re- 
sort but that financing for the above-type proJects will be 
available on a timely basis from sources other than AID. 
Delays in completing power and 
transportation facilltles 
Electric power 
From 1962 through 1966 AID authorized about $62.4 mll- 
lion in loans to the ROKG for purchasing necessary equipment 
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to construct four power plants and Improve and expand the 
transmlsslon and dlstrlbutlon (T&D) system. Completion of 
three of these proJects has been delayed for periods ranging 
from 1 to 2 years for various reasons--some delays are due 
to ROKG's and KECO's untimely actions and some are due to 
delays mthln AID. Had these proJects been implemented on 
schedule, the current power shortage would not have been so 
serious. 
Completion of the Kunsan Thermal Power Plant has been 
delayed almost 2 years from its orlglnally planned comple- 
tion date. One delay of 9 months--from date of loan autho- 
rlzatlon to date of loan agreement--was due to the time 
taken to change the wording relating to debt llmltatlons In 
the loan agreement. Another g-month delay occurred because 
of KECO's and ROKG's failure to meet condltlons precedent to 
loan disbursement. Other delays occurred because KECO 
changed the coal source and because KECO failed to assign a 
proJect manager. The Kunsan Power Plant was originally 
scheduled to start operations In 1966 but was not placed In 
service until April 1, 1968. If the Kunsan plant had been 
completed as planned, total installed capacity of KECO power 
plants would have increased by 66 megawatts (MW), which 
would have been almost sufficient to cover the largest an- 
ticipated monthly power deficit In 1967. 
The Seoul Thermal Power Plant (137.5 MW) was originally 
scheduled to commence operation In 1968, but the present 
forecast IS that It will be completed in 1969. The delays 
on this plant were due to a change of the rated capacity of 
the plant, the change being recommended by AID consultants 
In June 1966 and not approved by AID/Washington (AID/W) un- 
til September 1966, and to KECO's lnablllty to finally meet 
condltlons precedent relating to rate increases and obtain 
legislation permitting a revaluation of KECO's plant. 
The first T&D proJect was supposed to bring T&D faclll- 
ties In line with the generation construction program that 
was In progress and was programmed to make available abun- 
dant power to the system. According to USOM's Justlflcatlon 
for recommending the loan, inadequate T&D would become a 
llmltlng factor to the utlllzatlon of the generating faclll- 
ties and to unrestricted delivery of electrlclty. This 
16 
protect was to be completed rn 24 months from the date the 
loan agreement was slgned (December 1964). The proJect 1s 
now expected to be delayed for a total of about 2 years. 
KECO falled to meet condltlons precedent to flnanclng, which 
delayed financing of procurement until January 1966--over 
1 year from the date of the loan agreement. Numerous 
changes have been made In the subproJects In this loan, 
which have also delayed completion for varying periods of 
time. 
An example of delays due to changes 1s that KECO pro- 
posed that certain subproJects be changed In order to re- 
flect the then current needs. These changes involved no 
significant overall cost increase. The changes were re- 
quested In September 1965, after USOM informed KECO that 
these changes were minor and could be approved by USOM wlth- 
out referral to AID/W. An AID offlclal stated that, prior 
to receiving this lnformatlon from USOM, KECO had no Inten- 
tion of requesting any changes because It feared excessive 
delays In the proJect. Subsequently, USOM determined that 
these changes must be referred to AID/W for approval The 
requested changes were submitted to AID/W In February 1966 
and were eventually approved upon revlslon of the loan 
agreement In June 1966 Overall, a delay of 8-l/2 months 
resulted In this one Instance. 
Diesel engrnes 
Since 1962 AID has provided three development loans, 
totaling more than $36 mllllon, for the procurement of die- 
se1 engines to replace the steam locomotives used on the 
maJorlty of KNR's operating lines. The diesels were Justi- 
fled on the basis of operating cost and foreign exchange 
savings and the ablllty of diesels to haul more weight and 
cover more mlleage than steam locomotives. Our review 
showed that the possible savings In operating costs were not 
fully realized because of delays In lmplementatlon of one 
of the loans. 
The second diesel loan In the amount of $11 mllllon 
was delayed about 1 year-- between the time of authorlzatlon 
of the loan (March 5, 19641, and the signing of the loan 
agreement (March 12, 1965)--because of dlscusslons relating 
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to a stipulation in the loan agreement that JXNR should be 
a separate entity under the mnistry of Transportation and 
because of a discussion on possible changes In the number 
and sizes of the diesels to be procured. Shop equipment 
to be purchased under the third loan will apparently be 
delayed about 9 months because of a KNR delay In meeting 
conditions precedent relating to contracting for audit ser- 
vices. These delays cause less effective operations, since 
diesel locomotives cost less and operate more efflclently 
and the shop equipment is needed to effectively maintain 
rolling stock. 0 
In our draft report we proposed that AID take adequate 
measures to facilitate the implementation of loans so that 
lengthy delays will be prevented. 
In commenting on the delays In completing power and 
transportation facilities, AID stated that the use of the 
word "delay" 1s "unmeritorious" since it is difficult to 
establish a norm for the desirable amount of time for each 
step because of the great differences between proJects 
In its opinion, when there 1s a delay It is due to normal 
proJect compllcatlons or to care taken to avoid mistakes 
or waste of funds AIDfeelsthat several of the delays 
related to serious problems in implementing self-help mea- 
sures and believes that the institution-building aspects 
were as important as the meeting of physical schedules 
We concur that care must be taken to avoid any signifl- 
cant deficiencies, however, we believe that the time ex- 
pended to resolve some of the problems was excessive--for 
example, a g-month delay to change to the wording relating 
to debt llmltatlons in one loan and an 8-l/2 month delay 
to approve a minor change so lnsrgnlficant that It was not 
going to be requested because KECO feared an excessive de- 
lay. AID also Informed us that 
"Neither USOM nor AID have been satisfied with 
the length of time that it takes to complete loan 
projects, even apart from delays which result 
from self-help negotlatlons. However, a number 
of proposals have been made and initiated to 
shorten this time period without lmplnglng on the 
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soundness of proJect planning and execution or on 
any of our statutory requirements, for example, 
telescoping certain steps In the procedures and 
reducing the number of items that have to go back 
and forth for approval. 
"In addltlon, the Assistant Administrator for 
the East Asia Bureau has recently Inaugurated a 
system of review and approval actions which 1s 
expected to reduce the chance of some types of 
serious and lengthy delays which has been expe- 
rienced with some of our large capital proJects 
in the past 'I 
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Questlonable need for loans for small 
and medium Industry expansion 
In 1966 AID granted two loans totaling $17 mllllon to 
be used to provide foreign exchange for subloans to small 
and medium lndustrles By April 1967 the ROKG requested 
that these two loans be Increased by a total of $15 mllllon. 
In June 1967 AID increased one loan by $3 mllllon even 
though no part of the two 1966 loans had been utlllzed. On 
completion of our review, an Increase of $12 mllllon In the 
other loan was being reviewed by USOM and AID/W. We belleve 
that the requests for these Increases were premature and 
that AID should not have granted the increase of $3 million, 
because the 1966 loans had not been utlllzed and because 
the ROKG appeared to have access to sufflclent foreign ex- 
change to satisfy current demands for small and medium In- 
dustrlal loans. 
Since 1960 AID has granted three loans aggregating 
$25 mllllon for small and medium industry expansion. Of 
these loans, two totaling $17 mllllon were to the Korean 
Reconstruction Bank (KEB). The third loan, to the Medium 
Industry Bank (MIB), was lnltlally for $5 mllllon but was 
increased In June 1967 to $8 mllllon. KRB and MIB were to 
make subloans to eligible lndustrlal firms for the lmporta- 
tlon of machinery and equipment. 
The first of the two loans to KRB was for $5 mllllon 
and was granted In April 1960. In September 1962, however, 
AID froze disbursements under this loan because the selec- 
tion of subborrowers was not In accord with AID's under- 
standlng of loan criteria AID then undertook a program to 
Improve the management of KRB. A management consulting firm 
and a public accounting firm were engaged to perform reviews 
of KRB operations and assist in lmplementlng improvements 
In the meantime, the loan was reopened under a revised agree- 
ment. 
In 1966 AID granted a second loan to KRB for $12 mll- 
lion and a loan to MIB for $5 million. By April 1967 the 
ROKGhadrequested Increases, totaling $15 mllllon, In these 
two loans--$3 mllllon In the loan to MIB and $12 mllllon in 
the loan to KRB. These increases were Justified on the 
basis that the avallable foreign exchange did not satisfy 
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the Investment requirements However, as of June 1967, the 
banks had not utlllzed any of the $17 mllllon provided In 
1966 
In June 1967 AID Increased the loan to MIB by $3 mll- 
lion On completion of our review, the increase of 
$12 mllllon In the loan to KRB was being reviewed by USOM 
and AID/W 
In our draft report we proposed that AID reevaluate 
the necessity of future development loans for this purpose, 
lncludlng the proposed increase of $12 mllllon In the loan 
to KRB In commenting on our findings, AID informed us In 
January 1968 that the proposed increase was being delayed 
so as to coordinate the time of Its avallablllty to the 
time of depletion of the funds provided In 1966 Also, AID 
pointed out that any delays In the utlllzatlon of AID loans 
drd not reflect the lack of need or demand for subloans 
The demand for subloans had far exceeded the avallablllty 
of funds, which made I-L necessary for KRB to establish and 
apply prlorltles to subloan appllcatlons 
As previously polnted out AID has concluded that power, 
transportation, and large capital proJects are of such prl- 
orlty to the ROKG that financing can and will be obtained 
from sources other than AID. Therefore, AID firmly be- 
lleves It should use a large percent of its llmlted funds 
for development of medium and small lndustrles. Also, AID 
informed us In January 1968 that 
"In the past few years, demand for foreign ex- 
change has risen sharply among small and medium 
lndustrles reflecting the rapidly expanding 
nature of the Korean economy and the need for 
modernlzatlon of plant and equipment Since 
1965, approximately $40,750,000 In foreign ex- 
change loans has been made available to small and 
medium Industry through the MIB and KRB. Demand 
for these funds, as measured by the total amount 
of appllcatlons received, exceeds $200 mllllon 
leaving a gap of some $160 mllllon. While as 
much as 25-35 percent of this gap may not be 
bankable, it 1s nevertheless obvious that the 
shortage of foreign exchange credit has been and 
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still 1s crltlcal and well in excess of $100 mll- 
lion Of this unfulfilled need for FX flnanclng 
for small and medium Industry, only about $60 mrl- 
lion 1s currently under conslderatlon by flnanc- 
lng lnstltutlons lncludlng A.I.D., IBRD, Federal 
Republic of Germany, and the Japanese Government. 
The ROKG 1s also exploring the posslblllty of 
utlllzlng Its own foreign exchange to assist in 
flnanclng such credit." 
* * * * * 
"laklng into account the present avallablllty of 
foreign exchange for small and medium lndustrles, 
there 1s still a large requirement not yet fl- 
nanced or In immediate prospect. ***I 
In making the foregoing comments, AID seems to have 
overlooked the fact that the ROKG hadpublacly announced 
plans to utlllze $60 rnllllon of Its own foreign exchange 
for capital investment loans to small and medium lndustrles. 
Moreover, It seems that the $60 mllllon to be released by 
the ROKG plus the $60 mllllon currently under conslderatlon 
by the lnstltutlons mentioned by AID will be more than 
sufflclent to satisfy current demands for small and medium 
lndustrlal loans 
Concerning future demands for small and medium In- 
dustrial loans, we believe that AID should encourage the 
ROKG to utlllze Its own foreign exchange and to look to 
sources other than AID for financing As previously 
pointed out, the ROKG has been IncreasIng Its foreign ex- 
change reserves and 1s becoming lncreaslngly able to ob- 
tain financing from sources other than AID. Consequently, 
we believe that AID should be the source of last resort 
Concerning the proposed increase of $12 mllllon in 
the loan to KRB, we belleve that AID should also encourage 
the ROKG to obtain these funds from another source 
DEVELOPMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES 
AID's efforts In this area have been primarily toward 
asslstlng in the development of mineral and water resources 
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The extent of progress In these areas has varied, advance- 
ments being noted In mineral exploltatlon except for the 
coal Industry. A relatively new program on water resources 
development 1s advancing satlsfactorlly. Since 1961, AID 
has oblrgated about $12.9 mrlllon In loans and grants to 
assist this sector, allocated as follows 
Type of assistance 
Amount 
(mllllons) 
Technical cooperation proJects $ 3.39 
Development loans 9.50 
Total $12.89 
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Need for development of coal 
resources 
Since 1956 AID and its predecessors have invested 
about $16 9 mllllon In developing and studying coal re- 
sources In Korea. Resultant recommendations by experts are 
that it 1s feasible and necessary that a large-scale In- 
vestment be made to rationally develop and utilize this 
fuel source. Regardless, AID has not followed through on 
these recommendations, the result being that, Instead of 
developing and utlllzlng this slgnlflcant natural resource, 
the ROKG 1s turning to lmportlng 011 as a maJor fuel 
source We believe that this causes preventlon of neces- 
sary expansion of the coal industry, which, along with a 
shortage of railroad facllltles, 1s requiring the ROKG to 
unnecessarily expend large amounts of its foreign currency 
to import oil 
The United States through AID and Its predecessor agen- 
cies has invested a total of $5 6 mllllon In defense support 
grants, $1 8 mrlllon for technical cooperation (lncludlng 
consultant contracts), and $9 5 mllllon In development loans 
to the Korean coal industry. In addition, excess equipment 
having an acqulsltlon value of $7 mllllon was made available 
through the Korean Office of Mineral Exploration Program for 
use by the entire mining Industry. 
The consultants hired by AID have been rendering gen- 
eral and technical services to the Korean coal industry 
since 1959. A maJor part of these services was the con- 
ducting of an lndustrywlde survey of the coal supply situ- 
atlon in the Republic of Korea (ROK). The survey report 
was presented to USOM In August 1966, and a supplementary 
report was submitted in March 1967. A prellmlnary report, 
which was consistent with the data presented In these re- 
ports, was submitted in December 1965 These reports 
pointed out that It 1s possrble for Korea to develop a 
steadily lncreaslng rate of production to reach 20 mllllon 
tons In 1973 and to sustain that annual rate beyond 1990 
on the basis of the known reserves of 500 mllllon tons as 
of January 1, 1967. The reports stated that there are many 
promlslng areas In Korea where coal-bearing formations are 
either known or believed to exist that have not been ex- 
plored and that, with contlnulng geological survey, addl- 
tlonal reserves could be delineated 
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The consultants belleve that, by InvestIng $62 mllllon 
(of which no more than $39 mllllon would be foreign ex- 
change) in the coal industry, to meet KECO requirements, 
the ROK would benefit from 
1 Lower electric power production costs. 
2 Savings In foreign exchange 
3. Development of a local industry and supporting com- 
munity development. 
4 Employment for 10,000 persons. 
5. Development of housing and community service bulld- 
ings. 
6. Increase In corporate taxes. 
7. Earnings in foreign exchange from exports. 
The consultants recommended that 
1 Large capacity, long life (base-load) coal mines In 
ROK be developed at a more rapid rate and to a 
greater extent than presently planned In order that 
future supplies of fuel may be provided most eco- 
nomically 
2. Geological exploration programs be continued In or- 
der to determine future coal reserves 
3. To ensure that production of coal ~111 keep pace 
wrth the growing demand, the ROK Government dls- 
continue Its adverse pollcles, such as holding down 
coal prices, and implement pollcles which will sup- 
port an increased rate of coal mine development, 
such as allowing coal prices to reach a reallstlc 
level and provldlng tax lncentlves to encourage in- 
vestment in coal 
4. A posltlve program be implemented lmmedlately for 
development of base-load mines for an ultimate 
capacity of 10 mllllon tons annually In order to 
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replace productive capacity, which wrll be lost as 
older mines are depleted, and to provide for In- 
creased coal production 
5. Increased total rail haulage capacity Mechanized 
coal-handling facllltles for loading and unloading 
would reduce car-turn-around time. 
6 A program of road Improvement, since a large portion 
of production 1s truck hauled from mines to rail 
loading points. 
The ROKG second 5-year plan (1967-71) proposed total 
flnanclng--$10 7 mllllon In foreign exchange and $22.6 mll- 
lion in local currency-- for all coal mine development The 
consultants estimate that this 1s less than one third of 
the total required to develop and equip base-load mines In 
order to produce 10 mllllon metric tons a year, 
During the 1966-67 winter season, Korea experienced a 
coal shortage, which was attributed to a shortage of rall- 
road facllltles rather than a shortage of coal. (The 
shortage of railroad facllltles 1s discussed on pages 13 
to 15 During this shortage, the ROKG encouraged the useof 
011 In lieu of coal In electric thermal plants and heavy 
industry Large amounts of KFX had to be expended for the 
011 The consultants estimated that, had the same amount 
of KFX as was used for 011 been used for coal mine develop- 
ment, It would have provided mine capacity to produce coal 
every year for 20 years, the tonnage of coal thus produced 
would have been approximately 18 times the tonnage of coal 
replaced by 011 
The ROK policy for substltutlng fuel 011 for coal In 
power plants , general lndustrlal plants, and commercral 
buildings has continued Three thermal plants plan to con- 
vert from coal-burning to oil-firing. The basis for this 
plan to substitute fuel 011 for coal 1s that the coal re- 
serves, which are llmlted to some 500 mllllon tons, are 
best suited for household heating and therefore should be 
conserved for that purpose. 
It should be noted that the consultants pointed out 
that, In addltlon to the 500 mllllon tons exlstlng In 
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known reserves, additional reserves could be delineated by 
means of continuing geological survey. Moreover, though - 
there be a steadily increasing rate of coal production to 
reach 20 million tons in 1973, the known reserves of 
500 million tons alone would sustain that annual rate be- 
yond 1990 
Moreover, the conversion of power plant fuel to 0x1 
does not appear to be necessary. The coal consultants in- 
vestigated the use of coal as a power plant fuel and found 
that beneflclatlon processes (oil treatment) can be applied 
to coals from some of the fields to produce fuel of uniform 
lower ash content and hence of considerably improved com- 
bustion characteristics for thermal plant usage. Related 
studies indicate that, by using beneflclated coal, the 
power industry could save about 331 mllllon won ($1 2 mil- 
lion) annually in fuel costs. Thus, the demand of the 
power industry for run-of-mine production actually would be 
decreased The studies showed that the use of 011 as a 
fuel would result in higher fuel costs and in the use of 
valuable foreign exchange for 011 imports. 
In commenting on the foregoing matters, AID pointed 
out that 
1 An October 1965 report stated that coal-fired ther- 
mal power plants are about 10 percent cheaper to 
operate than equivalent plants fired by oil only 
However, the report stated also that in the future 
this margin will decrease and may be completely 
eliminated. 
2. KECO had decided that all future thermal plants 
will be totally oil-fired. This decision was in 
accord with a feaslblllty study showing that, when 
compared to the costs of a coal/oil plant, the 
costs of an oil-fired unit are $8 mllllon less In 
the original capital investment and about $750,900 
less yearly in the cost of producing power, includ- 
ing both overhead and operating costs. These sav- 
ings were based on coal and oil prices as of June 
1966 
3. On October 1, 1967, the coal price was Increased by 
30 percent, therefore, the savings from using 011 
will increase. Moreover, 011 prices include a lo- 
percent Government tax and coal prices do not In- 
include transportation costs 
We recognize that the orlglnal capital investment 1s 
much less for an oil-fired plant than for a coal-flred 
plant and we are not questlonlng KECO's declslon to con- 
struct only oil-fired plants In the future However, for 
those plants that were lnltlally constructed to use coal or 
those that could use either fuel,we believe that AID should 
encourage the ROKG to use coal, even If the price of coal 
1s somewhat higher than that of 0x1 The efflclent use of 
coal resources presents considerable potential for allevl- 
atlng many of the basrc problems of Korea's economic struc- 
ture-- utlllzatlon of natural resources, reduction of un- 
necessary imports, increasing employment--all of which are 
necessary elements in achlevlng a self-sufflclent economy 
The potential savings In foreign exchange from the use of 
coal is particularly important. For example, an August 
1966 study showed that the development of adequate coal 
mine capacity to meet KECO's annual requirement for 20 
years would require a one-time expenditure of $62 mllllon, 
of which $39 mllllon would be foreign exchange. On the 
other hand, 011 imports would cost about $37 mllllon In 
foreign exchange annually, or $735 mllllon during the same 
20-year period. 
In our draft report, we propos'ed that AID make every 
effort to demonstrate to the ROKG the benefits of an ade- 
quate coal-development policy and take measures to assist 
the ROKG In developing this industry for the benefit of 
the ROK economy and In achieving AID's goals of helping 
the ROK to achieve self-sufflclency. 
AID informed us that, to help answer the coal/o11 is- 
sues, the Korean Institute of Science and Technology has 
been commlssloned to carry out a study of overall energy 
demands and investment posslbllltles. AID belleves that, 
with the results of this study, It will be in a better 
posltlon to advise the ROKG on rts entire fuel energy sltu- 
ation 
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DEVELOPMENT OF AGRICULTURE 
FORESTRY AND FISHERIES 
This primary sector of the Korean economy has been as- 
slstedthroughtechnlcal cooperation, commodltxes, and Just 
recently by two large development loans for fertlllzer 
plants that will supply fertilizer previously provided under 
the commodity import program. 
Overall, since 1961, United States input to this area 
totals $708 mllllon, as follows 
Type of assistance 
Amount 
(millions) 
Technical cooperation proJects $ 2.3 
Public Law 480 commodltles (wheat and 
other food products) 506.9 
Supporting assistance commodltles 
(fertilizer) 150.0 
Development loans 48.8 
Total $708.0 
AID has recently completed an evaluation of USOM's ru- 
ral development program, which will be followed by prepara- 
tlon of an overall Rural Development Strategy Statement for 
1967-71. Briefly, AID's evaluation concluded that, although 
agriculture has progressed In the past,as lndlcated by In- 
creased production and yield per land unit, certain important 
elements of agricultural needs have not been developed. 
These include a multipurpose approach to land and water de- 
velopment and utlllzatlon, an adequate flnanclng system, de- 
velopment of forestry for conservation and fuel needs, and 
adaptive research, especially on wheat. AID's current eval- 
uation of agriculture also encompassed the Public Law 480 
program, 
Our review of this sector of the Korean economy was 
limited to followup on findings rn our prior report 
(B-125060, September 21, 1962). 
Fertlllzer program 
Among the various commodltles imported into Korea under 
the supporting assistance program 1s fertilizer Since 1961 
about $150 mllllon has been obligated for fertilizer Imports 
under this program. Our prior report, which covered the 
period 1957-61, commented on the following problems relating 
to the handling of fertilizer under this program 
1. Lack of technical guidance by USOM. I 
2. International Cooperation Admlnlstratlon (AID's 
predecessor) was being excluded from basic fertll- 
lzer declslons. 
3. Fertilizer procurement costs were higher than neces- 
sary because lower off-season prices were not being 
obtained and commercial importers were not able to 
obtain prices as low as those obtained by Korean 
Government agencies. 
4. Fertilizer produced by an ICA-financed fertilizer 
plant was not being utlllzed. 
We recommended that conslderatlon be given to increasing 
USOM's advisory staff, to further improve admlnlstratlon of 
this program. 
During our current review, we found that because of 
changes In procurement planning and procedures and the es- 
tablishment of a closer working relatlonshlp between USOM 
advisors and cognizant ROKG agencies, these problems had 
been eliminated. Also, we were informed that fertilizer lm- 
ports under the commodity import programs will cease after 
the 1967 program and that future imports will be financed by 
Korean-owned foreign exchange. This reduction of Import 
needs has been made possible by increased local production 
capablllty of the Korean economy, lncludlng an anticipated 
large increase which was due to the construction of two 
mixed-fertlllzer plants that were financed partially by AID 
development loans. 
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DEVELOPMENT OF GOVERNMENT 
ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION 
AID 1s now operating a group of technlcal cooperation 
proJects that deal with and assist the ROKG In stabllzlng 
and lmprovlng the operation of the Government and other 
closely related operations, such as banklng and credit. Ob- 
llgatlons under these various proJects have totaled over 
$3.7 million since fiscal year 1961. MaJor current proJects 
include economic planning, improvement In admlnlstratlon of 
banking, and improvement In credit and revenue admlnlstra- 
Won. On the basis of the improvements throughout this sec- 
tor rn admlnlstratlon and in growth of savings, revenues, 
exports and other economic lndlcators, It appears that these 
proJects have been worthwhile. 
The purposes of the economic planning proJect are for 
gaining an understanding of condltlons of and prospects for 
Korea's economy, provldrng guidance and assistance on for- 
mulation of economic pollcles and investment plans, and ana- 
llzlng important social proJects relating to modernlzatlon 
Consultants under this proJect assisted In the development 
of Korea's current 5-year plan and In a maJor Interest-rate 
reform Outside experts have given qualified approval to 
the 5-year plan as a solid guide for economic development, 
and the Interest-rate reform 1s said to be a maJor factor In 
the improvement In domestic savings, which has taken place 
In the past 2 years 
The revenue improvement proJect, carried out by bor- 
rowed Internal Revenue Service employees, was not too suc- 
cessful until 1965, when USOM convinced ROKG offlclals that 
a decline In AID assistance made self-generation of operat- 
ing funds a necessity Since that time, AID's tax advisors 
have assisted In helping the ROKG to reorganize and improve 
its taxation agencies, establish training programs, and as- 
slst In tax structure changes A measure of the improvement 
can be seen by a comparison of tax revenues of 1965 with 
those of 1966 These revenues rose from 41 8 bllllon won in 
1965 to 70.5 bllllon won In 1966, an increase of about 
69 percent. Also, revenue collections for the first 
6 months of 1967 were exceeding the increased estimated rate 
of tax collections for 1967 
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The proJect for improvement of admlnlstratlon of bank- 
ing and credit has primarily been directed toward ROKG 
banking lnstltutions and has utilized contract consultants 
to a large degree. The proJect 1s related closely to the 
flnanclal loans made by AID to these banks. The consultants 
have made a number of recommendations for banking lmprove- 
ments, which have been accepted and implemented by the bank- 
ing institutions. 
Other lnstltutlonal progress which USOM states reflects 
rts influence through the above-mentioned and other proJects 
includes 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
Strengthening of capabllltles and program of ROKG's 
Admlnlstratlve Improvement Research Commlsslon. 
Shifting ROKG In-service training to a more Job- 
related basis. 
Development of a modernized Korean posltlon classl- 
fication system. 
A start toward lmprovlng the ROKG salary structure. 
A very slgnlflcant growth of lntermlnlsterlal con- 
sultative and Joint working groups in a large number 
of fields of economic development in which coordlna- 
tion was previously lacking. 
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SCOPE OF REVIEW 
The basic purpose of our review of the economic assls- 
tance program for Korea was to examine into and make obser- 
vations as to the general effectiveness of this program In 
accompllshlng United States obJectives In Korea. Our review 
was directed prlmarlly to development loan projects, which 
are becoming the largest single segment of economic assls- 
tance to Korea. 
We reviewed program documents, reports, correspondence, 
and other pertinent records available at AID offices In 
Washington, D.C ) and In Korea. We discussed appropriate 
matters with responsible Unlted States offlclals and with 
representatives of certain agencies of the ROKG. In addl- 
tlon, we vlslted selected locations In the country, where 
development loan proJects were being carried out. In pre- 
paring this report, we considered the comments submitted to 
us by AID/W in January 1968. 
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE 
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
WASHINGTON D C 20522 
AssI!xANT 
ADMINISTRATOR 
Mr. Oye V Stovall 
Director, International Division 
U S General Accounting Office 
Washington, D. C 20548 
Dear Mr. Stovall- 
We appreciate the opportunity aforded this Agency to review the General 
Accounting Office draft report entitled "Review of Economic and Technical 
Assistance Program for Korea I' Agency comments, which are included as an 
attachment to this letter, list some of the actions taken by our Mission 
in Korea to improve our operations there In addition, we have suggested 
various word changes which should more clearly explain the material pre- 
sented in the report 
We will be pleased to confer with you or members of your staff to discuss 
the Agency's comments, if you consider it necessary 
Sincerely yours, 
A-4 
H Rex Lee 
Attachment* a/s 
GAO note The page numbers cited by the Asslstant AdmInIs- 
trator for Admuustratlon In these comments re- 
fer to pages In the draft report submltted for 
review, the page numbers shown In brackets refer 
to the corresponding pages of this report. 
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AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
COMMENTS ON THE 
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE (GAO) DRAFT REPORT ENTITLED 
"REVIEW OF ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FOR KOREA" 
Set forth are comments and sugbastlons which are keyed to the draft report 
by topic headings and page numbers Requests for deletions of security 
classlflcatlons are also keyed to page numbers as applicable 
[See GAO note on p. 47.1 
Pages 25 to 30 LE to l27 - Power The Power Survey Team's (PST) forward 
proJectlons were made In 1964 and early m 1965 The work of the Team was 
completed in April of 1965 Since that time the Gross National Product (GNP) 
has moved conslderably higher than had orlglnally been anticipated and In 
fact economic development across the board had Increased at a rate much faster 
than anyone expected Further, Korea has been very successful In attracting 
foreign capital Investment into the country and this has contributed to addl- 
tlonal requirements for electric power which could not have been foreseen 
The category of small and medium lndustrles has grown at a very rapld rate 
and the demand for power for this category of user has increased at the pre- 
sent time to a 29 6 percent per annum growth figure The ROKG and the Korea 
Electrx Company (KECO) have gone all out In securing from various foreign 
governments, loans for additional generating capacity to keep up with the 
growth rate 
In this general sltuatlon of rapld growth in the economy requxr-Lng frequent 
upward revlslons of estimates of various economx variables, KECO, the ROKG, 
and the USOM have partlclpated m a Joint commlttee established to keep power 
needs and lmplementatlon of the construction program under continual review 
This review has resulted in a series of upward revlslons of future power 
demands In response to these estimates, KECO and the ROKG have made pro- 
vlslons for some relatively rapid increases in total generatlng capacity 
and have also Increased the longer term construction program 
In oraer to get quick relief, KECO purchased 10 fifteen-megawatt (MW) gas 
turbines from Japan Four of these are in operation and the other SIX wrll 
be operating in another 2 months The ROKG and KECO are taking other emergency 
measures to provide addltlonal temporary power units this year However, there 
will still be some deflclencles for a short period until the Kunsan Thermal 
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plant 1s placed III service m April 1968 The Kunsan contrlbutlon (75 MW) 
will be ample until the fall of 1968 To Increase capacity for that period, 
KECO 1s negotlatlng for 90 MW of addltlonal gas turbine capacity which could 
be avallable by the fall of 1968 Pusan 3 and 4 (200 MW) are due to be In 
service by January 1969 
We belleve the emphasis on "delay I' here and elsewhere m the report 1s un- 
meritorious At best, each phase of a capital proJect requires much compll- 
cated work, and agreement and coordlnatlon between LJSOM, AID/W, and ROKG, 
KECO, and any American contractor Involved It 1s dlfflcult to establish a 
norm in the capital proJect agreement for the desirable time for each step 
because the circumstances differ so greatly from proJect to pro,ect More- 
over, and most important we think In getting a proJect moving and avoldlng 
delay, the dates we use in proJect agreements for lmplementatlon action by 
the Koreans must be used to some degree to push them to more expedltlous 
action than rmght otherwlse be the case When there 1s "delay," It 1s due 
to normal prodect compllcatlons or to A I D 's lnslstence to take whatever 
care 1s needed to avoid mistakes or waste of funds 
We recognize, however, that in lnstltutlon-bullding efforts, self-help negotla 
tlons and agreements are crltical These frequently require dlfflcult, time- 
consuming Korean declslons, However, the result 1s often worth the delay 
Several of the delays In the proJects mentioned In the GAO report (Kunsan 
Thermal, Seoul Thermal, T&D #l, KNR 2nd & 3rd Diesel loans) related to serlouc 
problems on the Korean side In lmplementlng the agreed upon self-help measure< 
In the loan agreements We belleve the lnstltutlon-bulldlng aspects were re- 
qulred In any proJect to be as Important as the physical aspects and should 
not be subordinated to meeting physical schedules 
[See GAO note on p, 47.5 
Pages 30 - 37 l?w to 127 - Railroad Transportation A I D takes the same 
exception to the use of the term "delay" on page 34 Instead of "time elapsed," 
as we did above The second Diesel loan was authorlaed March 5, 1964, and the 
loan agreement was slgned March 12, 1965 While we agree that the length of 
time between the loan authorlaatlon and slgnlng was undesirable, there were 1~ 
portant issues concerning the flnanclal structure of the Korean Natlonal 
Railroad (KNR) that had to be resolved before the loan agreement could proper- 
have been signed Despite very strong A I D efforts to get these issues re- 
solved as quickly as possible, It was not able to do so before the March 1965 
slgnlng date 
A key issue was thermplementatlon of the "separate entity" concept The 
InternatIonal Development Assoclatlon (IDA) loan of August 1962 required that 
KNR be established as a "separate entity" and this requirement was repeated x 
A I D 's first loan to KNR (signed October 29, 1962) The ROKG issued a 
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Cabinet Decree on December 17, 1963, provldlng for reorganlzatlon of KNR In 
accordance with this concept, but key elements of the shift to a buslness- 
type management were not introduced until early 1965--particularly the 
establishment of business-type accounting and budget management which was 
dependent on the results of a technical assistance effort with KNR, carried 
out in 1964 by Booz-Allen-Hamllton and financed by proceeds from the IDA loan 
A I D felt that this shift, which was required In the first loan to KNR, should 
be effected before It slgned a second loan, and also that the ROKG should agree 
in wrltlng to some other points involved in implementing the concept of a 
"separate entity" and In making the railroad more of a self-financing entity, 
VlZ. 
a That the KNR's commercial accounting system Include the necessary 
accounts and procedures to record appropriate asset reserves for depreclatlon 
modernlzatlon, and expansion 
b Acceptance by the ROKG and the KNR of the prlnclple that the KNR 
should make avallable from its revenues funds adequate to finance an lncreaslng 
proportion of new capital Investment 
Some other particulars were also involved, and the whole package was 
agreed to by mid-January 1965 
It should be noted that the time taken up to December 1964, to resolve 
the foregoing issues, was not time lost In any case, because It was A I D s 
policy from the sprln g of 1964 to December not to sign any pendlng loan agree- 
ments until the ROKG had taken adequate actlon on a number of basic policy 
measures to stablllze the economy The latter actlon was necessary to create 
a healthy overall economic cllmate in which the expenditure of A I D loan 
funds could be expected to be more effective By late November, much progress 
had been made 
The further time required In the first quarter of 1965 was to iron out 
differences of view over a new proposal by KNR to change the equipment to be 
f lnanced A new General Manager of KNR proposed larger and more expensive 
locomotives than those recommended by the American consulting englneerlng f'lrm 
(Coverdale and Colpltts) The consultants had made an extensive study of the 
needs of KNR and their recommendations had been accepted by the preceding 
General Manager, ROKG, USOM, and AID/W (There was some feeling that the 
new General Manager was influenced by an equipment supplier on this point) 
The Mlnlstry of Transportation then replaced the General Manager and his suc- 
cessor agreed with the consultant's recommendations 
A I D views the shortages of freight cars as being only one of several 
needs of the KNR In addltlon to rolling stock, the KNR requires lmprove- 
ments in station faclllties, marshalllng yards, double tracking and central 
traffic control In many areas, automatic block signals, communlcatlons and 
several refinements In other areas that are mutually interdependent with 
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rolling stock for railroad operations It also requires continuing 
Increases In the modern managerial skills essential to running a railroad 
To meet many of these needs the KNR and the IDA have Just signed an $11 0 
mllllon credit for 600 coal hopper cars and 450 0~1 tank cars To assist 
the KNR In some of its other needs, IDA 1s also provldlng experienced 
technlclans to assist in (1) Train Scheduling, (2) Rolling Stock Operations, 
(3) Supply Management, (4) Shop Management, and (5) Marshalllng Yard Operations 
It 1s believed that these top level technlclans will provide much needed skills 
for the betterment of KNR operations 
The maln thrust of A I D advice to the KNR, the ROKG, and those agencies 
provldlng assistance to them,has been to accelerate their efforts to build 
transport capabllltles so as to catch up with and get a bit ahead of the 
rapldly expanding demands for transport To assist these efforts, A I D has 
been attempting to speed up the lmplementatlon of our diesel loans and has 
consulted extensively with the Japanese Government and the International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) on their assistance XI this field, 
urging maximum speed Under the third diesel loan signed June 29, 1966, all 
locomotives were developed by August 1967, 4 months ahead of schedule The 
USOM/K continues to work with the ROKG In a Joint committee to keep the trans- 
port sltuatlon under review and plan ways and means of Improving It 
PaPes 37 to LO PO to 2g,- Small & Medium Loans 
[See GAO note on p. 47.1 
It should be accented that any delays In the utilization of A I D loans 
through Korean IntermedIate credit institutions do not reflect a lack of 
need or demand for such funds by Korean private firms It does reflect the 
fact that the handling of A I D dollar loans 1s a new actlvlty to such banks, 
that the prescribed practices and procedures by both the ROKG and A I D as 
well as the general difficulty of obtalnlng credit in Korea involve a con- 
slderable time span for completion of the admlnlstratlon of an A I D sub- 
loan However, under the best circumstances, the authorlzatlon of an A I D 
loan to finance sub-loans by an lntermedlate credit lnstltutlon 1s only the 
lnltlal step of a long involved process of making and lmplementlng such 
sub-loans This 1s particularly true of the mltlal A I D loans such ab 
the '$5 mllllon loan to the KRB and $8 mllllon to the Medium Industry Bank 
(MIB) It should be kept In mind that A I D 1s not only lending funds, 
but 1s asslstlng In the development of new flnanclal lnstltutlons 
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The $12 mllllon loan to KRB represented the second A I D loan of this 
nature During the interval, A I D had supplled considerable technlcal 
assistance under contracts with the A T Kearney Co and the Arthur Young 
co In view of Its dlfflcultles under the lnltlal $5 million loan, KRB has 
made special effort to assure that there would not be a repetltlon of the 
previous experience 
Further, the demand for loans has far exceeded the avallablllty of funds which 
made It necessary for KRB to establish and apply prlorltles to sub-loan applica- 
tions and to evaluate the loan appllcatlons at one time, Instead of processing 
one loan at a time As of December 1, 1967, the KRB had submltted 14 such 
loans to USOM for approval Five of these loans totaling $3,289,117 have been 
approved by USOM and letters of credit are In the process Two of the loans 
totaling $670,000 have been reJected and the remalnlng seven amounting to 
$3,654,753 r a e under review by the Loan Gbmrmttee The total approved or under 
USOM review 1s over 50 percent of the $12 rmlllon loan, although the first 
letter of commitment thereunder was only opened in June 1967 
With further reference to the Japanese loans, they are restricted to purchases 
from Japan and do not meet the requirements and desires of Korean businessmen 
for U S machinery and equipment Also, A I D dollar loans not only directly 
finance U S exports but promote a demand for further U S goods in the form of 
spare parts, raw materials, and replace elements A I D feels it 1s important 
to have a steady avallablllty of U S sub-loan money through the KRB for this 
purpose At the present rate, the second KRB loan will be exhausted In a few 
months The third loan appllcatlon 1s being delayed so as to coordinate its 
avallablllty to the de@&lon of the second loan 
[See GAO note on p 47 1 
Pages L6-L7 - Recommendation Regarding Development Loans 
1 figes 20 to 227 Evaluation of current avallabllltles as well as future 
ProJectiona for foreign exchange 1s a contlnulng process within the USAID 
tisslon to Korea A I D through their partlclpatlon in the International 
Economic Consultative Organlzatlon for Korea (IECOX), sponsored by the IBRD, 
has access to the reports of Investment and loan activity of the 12 member 
nations As a result, A I D has a fairly accurate assessment of the avall- 
ablllty of foreign exchange for Korea 
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Tn the past few years, demand for foreign exchange has risen sharply 
among small and medium Industries, reflecting the rapidly expanding nature 
of the Korean economy and the need for modernlxatlon of plant and equipment 
S rice 1965, approximately $40,750,000 In foreign exchange loans has been 
made avallable to small and medium industry through the MIB and KRB Dcmard 
for these funds, as measured by the total amount of appllcatlons received, 
exceed $200 mllllon, leaving a gap of some $160 mllllon While as much as 
25-35 percent of this gap may not be bankable, It -LS nevertheless obvious 
that the shortage of foreign exchange credit has been and still 1s critical, 
and well In excess of $100 mllllon Of this unfulfilled need for FX flnanclng 
for small and medium Industry only about $60 mllllon 1s currently under 
conslderatlon by flnanclng lnstltutlons lncludlng A I D , IBRD, Federal 
Rrpubllc of Germany, and the Japanese Government The ROKG 1s also exploring 
the posslblllty of utlllzlng Its own foreign exchange to assist 1~ flnanclng 
such credit 
The IBRD 1s making $5 0 million available to medium and small industry, 
for expansion and development through a loan to the privately-owned Korean 
Development Finance Corporation (KDFC) A I D 1s also provldlng a $5 0 
mllllon loan to the KDFC 
The Japanese Claim Fund allocation for lndustrlal development recently 
made by the ROKG 1s still SubJect to Japanese Government approval The policy 
of the Japanese Government thus far 1s to adhere closely to the settlement 
agreement with Korea, which provides for $20 mllllon of Japanese Government 
loans per year to the ROKG for all purposes Small and medium lndustly loans 
are only one of several uses (railroad rolling stock, steel for bridge repalrs, 
pumps and lrrlgatlon materials, construction materials, shlpbulldlng materials, 
etc > for which these funds are programmed Thus, it 1s unlikely that the 
Japanese Government will release more than $10 mllllon per year, If that much 
for loans to small and medium industry Even the EPB which normally estimates 
Japanese loans very much on the high side, says It does not expect more than 
$45-50rmlllon to be committed to small Industry loans by the end of 1971 The 
ROKG Finance tinlstry has announed that, as of June 30, 1967, arrival on 
Japanese loans for promoting small and medium slae industries were $53,000 
or 3 percent of the $15 mllllon programmed In 1966 Thus the rate of flow 
of this program 1s proving to be quite slow 
Taking into account the present avallablllty of foreign exchange for 
small and medium Industries, there 1s still a large requirement not yet finance 
9r In immediate prospect Provision of addltlonalloan funds to the KRB and 
MIB would promote several U S and ROKG policy ObJectives, VIZ;* (1) Rapid 
development of small and medium size lndustrles which 1s one of many crltlcal 
sectors In overall growth of the Korean economy, (2) Increase employment and 
Income (small and medium lndustrles in Korea tend to be highly labor lntenslve 
(3) Expand and strengthen the private enterprise sector, (4) Strengthen lnstlt, 
tlonal capablllty to pursue the foregoing ObJectives 
Provlslon of U S funds In this form as well as through the machinery 
and equipment portlon of our program loans 1s a good way to create sales op- 
portunltles for a wide variety of U S products in Korea AID , therefore, 
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feels It should continue to provide funds to the KRB and the MIB as planned 
[See GAO note on p. 47.1 
3 /&ges 12 to 15J Korea has made lmpresslve economic progress since 1964 
in growth of GNP, exports, domestlc savings, and lndustrlal development 
Although Korea still relies on rmlltary and economic assistance and has a low 
per capita Income, the Korean Government has established an environment of 
monetary and fiscal stablllty conducive to foreign investment and ecanormc 
development 
This environment and fiscal stablllty has encouraged other countries and other 
lending lnstltutlons to consider Korea as a satisfactory credit risk The 
IBRD and the IFC have lnltlated investments and loans In Korea IDA has Just 
signed an $11 0 rmlllon credit for Korea m the transportation sector and the 
U S Export-Import Bank has concluded $4 3 mllllon in several small loans to 
Korea and has given posltlve assurances that It ~111 do more before the end 
of FY 1968 
Because of A I D Is planned phase-down In Korea, we have already discussed 
with the ROKG the need for them to look to other sources for flnanclng, parti- 
cularly for power, transportation, and large capital proJects The President 
of the KECO recently told A I D that KEG0 had Just completed plans for the 
foreign exchange flnanclng for all their power plantconstructlon through 1975 
(total cost to KECO will be about 200 bllllon, 
$355 rmllion) 
foreign exchange portion about 
This includes financial assistance from Germany, Italy, Japan, 
U S private sources and possibly U S Export-Import Bank 
A I D has concluded that power, transportation and large capital proJects are 
of such priority to the ROKG that flnanclng can and will be obtained elsewhere 
A I D 1s the source of last resort and it 1s apparent that flnanclng for the 
above type proJects will be avallable on a timely basis from sources other 
than A I D We stand ready, however, to consider such proJects if other sources 
are not available 
Therefore, A I D firmly believes that using a large percentage of our limited 
funds for development of medium and small industries, a vital sector of the 
Korean economy but one which involves more risk, contrlbutes not only to 
development goals of the ROKG but helps to strengthen private enterprise 
[See GAO note on p 47 3 
4 @ages 15 Zo lgNe]ther USOM nor AID/W have been satlsfled with the 
length of time that it takes to complete loan proJects, even apart from 
delays which result from self-help negotlatlons However, a number of pro- 
posals have been made and lnltlated to shorten this tlnze period without 
unpinglng on the soundness of prodect planning and execution or on any of 
our statutory requirements. for example, telescoping certain steps in the 
procedures and reducing the number of Items that have to go back and forth 
for approval. 
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In addltlon, the Asslstant Admlnlstrator for the East Asia Bureau has 
recently Inaugurated a system of review and approval actlons which IS 
expected to reduce the chance of some types of serious and lengthy delays 
which has been experienced with some of our large capital proJects m the 
past 
Pages L8 to 5L LF2 to 2q - Coal vs 011 The PST report (Thomas report) 
of October 1965, said that coal-flredA/ thermal power plants are about 10 
percent cheaper to operate than equivalent plants fIred by 011 only How- 
ever, the report also stated that 'IIn the future this marglnwlll decrease 
and may be completely ellmlnaied" (Vol I, p 66) 
KECO has decided that all future thermal plants will be totally oil-flred, 
beglnnlng with the Pusan #3 and #4 units and the Yongnam #l and #2 units 
KECO's declslon was in accord with the feaslblllty study for the Yongnam 
#l thermal unit, conducted by the Kul~lan Corporation KulJlan's analysis 
showed that "when compared to a coal/o11 plant, an oil-flred unit results 
in a saving of $8 million In KECO's orlglnal capital Investment, and of 
approxLmately $750,000 yearlym the cost of producing power, lncludlng 
both overhead and operating costs " 
KulJlan's calculations were based on coal and 011 prices as of June1966 
On October 1, 1967, the coal price was increased by about 30 percent, to 
better cover actual mine operating costs and encourage the greater produc- 
tlon the GAO report recommends, so the savings from using 011 only will 
increase 
The trend In 0x1 prices has been relatively stable over the past few years, 
and the world's known reserves of 011 continue to increase Ku1 ~lan's 
calculations assumed a stable 011 price, but the price used Included the 
10 percent tax In Korea Deducting the 10 percent tax, to better reflect 
costs to the economy, results In an even larger saving from using 011 only 
in thermal power plants 
L/ "Coal-fIred" means using a fuel composed prlmarlly of 
coal (85 percent) with the remainder 011. 
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In addltlon, coal 1s about 2-$ times as expensive as 011 to transport, 
per b t u Although In Korea the transport costs from the point of 
orlgln are not reflected In dellvered coal prices (freight being absorbed 
In the price), the economy must bear the cost burden 
Another factor In the declslon to build oil-fired plants has been the 
growing household demand for coal In 1965, households consumed '70 per- 
cent of the total coal supply of 10 3 mllllon MT The Second Five-Year 
Plan provides for sufficient Investment to increase annual coal production 
only to 14 mllllon MT In 1971 The Yongnam #l plant alone would consume 
580,000 NT of coal yearly If It were coal-fired, according to the KulJian 
report 
Lastly, even If budgetary constraints permitted the sizable Investments In 
coal recommended by the Pierce Management Corporation, it 1s doubtful If 
coal output could be expanded rapidly enough to meet household, industrial, 
and electric power needs over the next few years if there were no conversions 
to 011 use in the manufactuslng and power sectors A I D and the ROXG feel 
that fuels pol~y 1s not an either-or matter, rather, llore of both ooal and 
011 will be needed In the future The relevant questlon 1s how much of 
each for what uses and, consequently, what types of investments in fuel8 
will be most beneflclal Several of the power plants now under construction 
will be able to use either fuel, as from time to tvne the market Indicates-- 
a practice also used In the U S To help answer the coal/oil issues, the 
Korean Institute of Science and Technology has been commlssloned to carry 
out a study of overall energy demands and investment posslbllltles The 
work IS being conducted under subcontract by the Battelle Memorz.al Institute 
With the results of this study, we will be in a better position to advlse the 
ROKG on their entlre fuel energy sltuatlon 
[See GAO note below.] 
GAO note. Deleted comments relate to classlfled or other 
matters discussed In the draft report but omltted 
from this report. AddItIonal lnformatron fur- 
nished to us by the Agency with these comments 
has been consldered In the preparation of thus 
report. 
US @AOWash,Dc 
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